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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 900262-CA

vs.
ELLIS R. BLACKWELL,
Defendant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction to hear the above-entitled appeal is conferred
upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Annotated,
Section 77-35-26 (2) (a) (1987), and also pursuant to Rule 3(a)
of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. This Court has
jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Annotated,
Section 78-2a-3 (f) (1989), because the appeal is from a District
Court in a criminal matter involving a Third Degree Felony.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from the final order of the District
Court, Judge Ronald 0. Hyde presiding, denying Defendant's
Motion to Suppress Evidence dated the 27th day of February,
1990.
DATE OF DECISION
Defendant entered a plea of guilty to the charge of possession of a controlled substance, a Third Degree Felony, on the
13th day of April, 1990, reserving at the time of plea the right
to appeal the decision of the Court relative to Defendant's
Motion to Suppress Evidence. Defendant was sentenced to serve a
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term not to exceed five years at the Utah State Prison.
granted credit for time served.

He was

STATEMENT OF,THE ISSUES PRESENTED ,0N APPEAL
WHETHER OR NOT THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED AS A RESULT OF A
URINALYSIS TEST SUBMITTED TO BY REASON OF A PAROLE
AGREEMENT CAN BE USED AS EVIDENCE TO SUBSTANTIATE A
NEW AND INDEPENDENT CHARGE.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant, Ellis R. Blackwell, was paroled by the Board
of Pardons of the State of Utah and signed an agreement setting
forth the conditions of that parole on the 19th day of June,
1989. One of the special conditions included in the parole
agreement was the agreement by Defendant to submit to random
urinalysis. On December 7, 1989, at approximately 12:45 p.m.,
Agent Jerry W. Summers saw the Defendant at Stimpson's Market.
Agent Summers reported that the Defendant attempted to flee from
him and that he gave chase, ultimately resulting in Defendant's
apprehension and being taken into custody. The Defendant was
transported to the Weber County jail and booked as a parole
violator. The Defendant submitted to a urinalysis at the jail.
He was advised by a parole agent that the urinalysis was a
condition of his parole. Mike Sargent told the Defendant that
all he wanted the urinalysis for was a comparision with a prior
test. The urinalysis test came back positive for illicit drugs.
The Defendant was charged with, among other things, possession
of a controlled substance, a Third Degree Felony, on or about
the 13th day of December, 1989.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
It is the Defendant's position that the results of a
urinalysis test submitted to by reason of the provisions of a
parole agreement and taken while in custody should have been
suppressed so far as its use in the prosecution of a new and
-2-

independant charge for possession of a controlled substance is
concerned.
ARGUMENT
Section 77-27-3, UCA (1953) as amended, grants to the
parole board alone the authority to impose conditions of parole.
Those conditions must bear a reasonable relation to the crime
for which the Defendant is being paroled and to the goal of
rehabilitation. The logical extention of the language set forth
in Section 77-27-3 would limit the use of evidence obtained as a
result of the implementation of those parole conditions to those
areas wherein the parole board and the parolee agreed to be
impacted. The parole agreement in question specifically states
that violation of the agreement, and/or any conditions thereof,
or (emphasis added) any new conviction for a crime, may result in
action by the board causing parole to be revoked or the parole
period to begin anew. The agreement itself implies that the
conditions are imposed to insure compliance with the parole.
Evidence obtained by reason of a warrantless search and as a
result of self-incriminating urinalysis should properly be
limited so as to impact the Defendant's prior sentence only. To
hold otherwise is to say that a parolee really has no 4th or 5th
Amendment rights as guaranteed by both State and Federal Constitutions.
Parolees definitely have 4th and 5th Amendment rights. The
liberty of a parolee includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty and and a parolee has a right to enjoy a significant degree of privacy.
State v. Fields, 686 P.2d 1379
(Hawaii, 1984). In the above case, the Hawaii court also said a
consent search obtained in an inherently coercive situation is
not a lawful consent. In the instant case the search of the
Defendant and his bodyfluids was required by his parole agreement. Defendant either consented to the test or his parole
could be violated and Defendant's parole revoked.
Such a
-3-

condition is inherently coercive at least as far as it's use to
substantiate a new charge is concerned.
The Defendant does not allege that the search pursuant to
the parole agreement is invalid for all purposes. Defendant
alleges that the search is improper only for purposes exceeding
the scope of the agreement. The State seeks to justify a
warrantless search and seizure on the basis that it was consented
to by the Defendant in his parole agreement. To that proposition
Defendant takes no offense. It is where the State seeks to use
that same evidence to substantiate an entirely independant crime
that we object and assert that constitutionally guaranteed
freedoms are being trampled on.
There is no question that self-incriminating statements
made during a custodial interrogation wherein evidence is being
sought upon which to base new charges must conform to the
requirements of Miranda v. Arizona^ 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Defendant asserts that to the extent that the evidence obtained
is being used to support new charges, the requirements in Miranda
and the 4th and 5th Amendments apply. There is a difference
between evidence obtained by reason of an agreement which is a
condition of parole being used as grounds to violate one's
parole and using the evidence so obtained to maintain a separate
criminal offense.
Parolees may be required to provide incriminating evidence
by correction officials for legitimate correction interest.
State y. Fogartyy 610 P.2d 140. But this case, which involved a
clause in a probation agreement which allowed any law enforcement
officer to conduct a warrantless search of the Defendant's
person, residence, or vehicle at anytime, stands for the proposition that such a provision is too broad. The Court in this case
stated that the purpose of the search must be related to the
Defendant's prior conviction or rehabilitation.
The Court
implied that such provisions are not valid for use to facilitate
future investigation of crimes.
-4-

In State v. .Wilson, 521 P.2d 1317 (Oregon, 1974), a convicted Defendant objected to a probation provision requiring her to
submit to a polygraph examination every ninety days. The Court
said, "The results of the examination can be used as evidence in
further proceedings in this case and in the determination of the
Defendant's probationary status; however, the results cannot be
used in any other case without Defendant's consent". Parole
revocation hearings are not considered criminal proceedings and
therefore do not trigger 4th and 5th Amendment rights. State v.
Age, 590 P. 2d 759 (Oregon, 1979). This case held that a condition requiring a probationer to submit to polygraph tests did
not violate 5th Amendment rights. However, the Court further
said that such a requirement would be improper if the district
attorney had power to make such a request. Clearly the implication is that a distinction is drawn between use of evidence
obtained as a result of a probation agreement as it relates to
the Defendant's probation and its use as evidence in an independant criminal action.
The Court in State y. ,Evans, 252 N.W.2d (Wise. 1977) recognized the distinction which the Defendant asserts is applicable
to this case. In this case the Defendant refused to account for
his whereabouts as required by his probation agreement, invoking
his 5th Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and his
probation was revoked as a result. The court said,
We resolve this issue by holding that statements or
the fruits of statements made by a probationer to his
probation agency or in a probation revocation hearing
in response to questions which as here, are the result
of pending charges or accusations of particular
criminal activity, may not be used to incriminate the
probationer in a subsequent criminal proceeding. We
reaffirm past decisions holding that a probationer's
refusal to account for his whereabouts and activities
is a serious violation of probation conditions which
may merit revocation.
In Evans, supra, the Defendant was not made aware that any
statements he made could not be used against him in subsequent
criminal proceedings. As a result, the court reversed and
-5-

remanded the case. In the instant case, the Defendant was told
specifically that submitting to the urinalysis test could not be
used against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution. Nevertheless , this is exactly what the State has done.
The State relied on two cases to support its position at
the suppression hearing. The first was Minnesota v. Murphy,
104 S.Ct. 1136, 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984). In that case a Defendant
sought to suppress testimony concerning his confession made
during a meeting with his probation officer with whom he was
required to meet as a condition of his probation following his
conviction on an earlier, and separate charge. The Minnesota
Court ruled that the confession was admissible because the
Defendant was not "in custody" at the time of the statement and
the confession was neither compelled nor involuntary.
The
Minnesota Court discussed the question of compulsion as it
relates to statements by a probationer to his probation officer.
The Court, quoting Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77, 38
L.Ed.2d 274, 94 S.Ct. 316 (1973), stated, "A Defendant does not
lose this protection (referring to his 5th Amendment rights) by
reason of his conviction of a crime; not withstanding that the
Defendant is imprisoned or on probation at the time he makes
incriminating statements, if those statements are compelled they
are inadmissible in a subsequent trial for a crime other than
that for which he has been convicted". The appellant contends
that the urinalysis test taken while the Defendant was in
custody and pursuant to a parole agreement results in the
Defendant being compelled to incriminate himself within the
meaning of the 5th Amendment. The Minnesota Court convincingly
states the reason why the urinalysis test in the instant case
should not be admissible against the Defendant upon a new and
independant charge when it says, "A State may require a probationer to appear and discuss matters that affect his probationary
status; such a requirement, without more, does not give rise to
a self-executing privilege. The result may be different if the
-6-

questions put to the probationer however relevant to his
probationary status, call for answers that would incriminate him
in a pending or later criminal prosecution. There is thus a
substantial basis in our cases for concluding that if the State,
either expressly or by implicationf asserts that invocation of
the privilege would lead to revocation of probation, it would
have created the classic penalty situation, the failure to
assert the privilege would be excused, and the probationer's
answer would be deemed compelled and inadmissible in a criminal
prosecution". In a separate opinion written by Justice Marshall
and joined by Justice Stevens and Justice Brennen, again citing
Lefkowitz v. Turley, supra, it is stated that "a probationer
retains the privilege enjoyed by all citizens to refuse, 'to
answer offical questions put to him in any ...proceeding, civil
or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings'". The separate opinion
goes on to state, "If a truthful response might reveal that he
has violated a condition of his probation but would not subject
him to criminal prosecution, the State may insist that he
respond and may penalize him for refusing to do so. By contrast,
if there is a chance that a truthful answer to a given question
would expose the probationer to liability for a crime different
from the crime for which he has already been convicted, he has a
right to refuse to answer and the State may not attempt to
coerce him to forgo that right. As the majority points out, if
the answer to a question might lead both to criminal sanctions
and to a probation revocation, the State has the option of
insisting that the probationer respond, in return for an express
guarantee of immunity from criminal liability".
The State also relied on the case of State of Utah v.
Velasquez, 672 P.2d 1254 (Utah, 1983) to support its position.
The Velasquez case however, can be distinguished from the
instant case in that in Velasquez, agents seized evidence
discovered pursuant to a warrant which was undertaken after a
-7-

determination that the parolee was in violation of his parole
agreement.
The evidence supporting the conviction of the
Defendant there was not the same evidence which justified the
intrusion into, or the denial of, his constitutional rights. It
was not the identical evidence which supported the parole
violation.
CONCLUSION
Defendant asserts that as a parolee, he is entitled to the
same constitutional rights as other citizens except, and to the
extent that those rights are altered by the terms of the parole
agreement. The parole agreement and the interest of the Board of
Pardons require that an alleged violation based upon evidence
obtained as the result fo urinalysis test submitted to because
of that parole agreement requirement be limit€>d in its effect
to the charges for which the parolee is paroled. To allow the
evidence so obtained to form the basis of an entirely new
criminal charge or charges makes the parole agents investigations
an exercise of a police function not intended by the statutory
mandate granted to the parole board by Section 77-27-3, UCA
(1953) as amended. Evidence so obtained is clearly the result
of compulsory situation. The results of the urinalysis test
submitted to by reason of the Dfednants parole agreement while
in custody should have been suppressed so far as its use in the
pending criminal charge or possession of a controlled substance
is concerned, and Defendant respectfully request that this
Court reverse his conviction.
u
Respectfully submitted this __J^____day of August, 1990.

STEPHEN A. LAKI
Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the z1! day of August, 19 90, I
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Appellant, postage prepaid to Paul Van Dam, Attorney General, 236
State Capitol Bldg., Salt Lake City, Utah 84114.

STEPHEN A. LAKER'
Attorney for Defendant
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ADDENDUM
Parole Agreement
Ruling on A Motion to Suppress Evidence

MEMBERS
PAUL W B0YD6N
VICTORIA J. PALACIOS
GARY L WEBSTER

PAUL W SHEFFIELD
Administrate*

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PAROLE AGREEMENT
I, ELLIS RAY BLACKWELL, agree to be directed and supervised by Agents of the Utah State
Department of Corrections and be accountable for my actions and conduct to Utah State
Corrections, according to tiiis Agreement.
I furcner agree to abide by all conditions of parole as set forth in this Agreement and any
additional conditions as set forth by the Utah State Board of Pardons, consistent with the
laws of tne State of Utan. I fully understand that the violation of this Agreement and/or any
conditions thereof or any new conviction for a crime may result in action by the Board causing
my parole to be revoked or my parole period to start over.
CONDITIONS OF PAROLE
On the day of my,release from the institution or confinement. I will
1. RELEASE:
report to my assigned Parole Agent, unless otherwise approved in writing.
2.
RESIDENCE:
I shall establish and reside at a residency of record and shall report such
residence or any change thereof to my Parole Agent. I shall not leave the
State of Utah witnout prior written authorization fromravParole Agent. It
is hereby acknowledged that should I leave the State of Utah without written
authorization from my Parole Agent, that I hereby waive extradition from anv
state in which I may be found, to che State of Utah.
3. CONDUCT:
I snail obey all State and Federal laws and municipal ordinances at all
times.
4. REPORT:
Ijshall make written or in person reports to mv Parole Agent *?y the fifth
of each and every month or ks
as directed
and I shall permit visits
to my place
r
e§ideuce#as required
r e r " — • by
*— my
— ™
— 1 - AAgent
—*- r—
-••of re§ideuce
Parole
for^the*purpose -of 'insuring
-*-*-compliance with
th conditions of parole.
I will seetc and maintain full-time employment unless I am participating in
EMPLOYMENT:
an educational or therapy program a]pproved by my Parole Agent.
SEARCH:
I agree to allotf a Parole Agent to search my person, residence, vehicle,
or any other property under my control, without a warrant, anv time day or
nigat, upon reasonable suspicion as ascertained by a Parole Agent, to insure
compliance with the conditions of my parole.
I shall not own, possess, or liave under my control any explosives.
7. WEAPONS
firearms, or any dangerous weapons as defined in Utah Code Annotated,
Section /6-10-501, as amended.
8. ASSOCIATION: I shall not associate with any known criminal in any manner which can
reasonably be expected to result in, or which has resulted in criminal or
illegal activity.
SPECIAL CONDITIONS: I shall:
1. Pay restitution of $399.75.
2. Submit to random urinalysis.
3. Successfully complete Substance Abuse Therapy. jy^.L^z**' <L% •. "* "*"•
4. Not consume or possess any alconol. 5. Successfully complete ISP Program.
Amended 5/15/1989
I nave read, unders d and agree to the above conditions and I hereby acknowledge receipt of
a copy of this
WITNESSED BY:

AJ^LLWOV

TITLE:

this

/<j
A?

SIGNED

day
dav oof <f ^^H0J A J ^

: frO- /?

19

Parolee
ADDRESS: /<*? ^ /

j£^U^v^^^r'
Administrator, Board of Pardons

&#*£*

S3-

^^^C^t^,
±e?

<k_

J^C.

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

1
T
Plaintiff,

vs.

RULING ON A MOTION TO
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

1

ELLIS R. BLACKWELL,

Case NO.

Defendant.

891920157

T

Having read the briefs and cases submitted, I hold that
evidence obtained as a result of a urinalysis test submitted to
by reason of a parole agreement can be used as evidence to
substantiate a new and independent charge.
Motion to suppress evidence is denied.
DATED this

<^7 day of February, 1990.

